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1. Introduction
The process of economic transition in the formerly socialist countries is reshaping the working lives
of women.  There are new demands made upon women and these affect their ability to contribute time
and money to household activity.  Women are re-assessing their lifetime decisions, such as when and
if to start a family and whether to participate in tertiary education.  These changes feed back into and
help create the structure of the transitional labour markets.  This paper studies one outcome of all
these changes, the gap in pay between men and women.
It may be useful to provide a very brief outline of women and work under communism.  Like all
generalisations, this does not capture the diversity of experience both between and within countries.
However, it does help in framing a basis against which to compare the changes documented below.
Under socialism women spent more time working, on average, than their Western counterparts.  The
system of wage and price setting more or less ensured that both adults in a nuclear family would have
to work in order to maintain a basic living standard. There was no unemployment in the sense of
joblessness. This was partly due to the social stigma that attached to unemployment but has also been
attributed to the way hard plan targets and soft budget constraints combined to produce continuous
excess demand for labour.  Women were accorded a wide range of rights and privileges at work, some
of which were formal.  In the Soviet system for instance, maternity leave was fully paid and women
were legally protected from overly physical and dangerous work.  Enterprise kindergartens, schools
and health care facilities were fairly commonplace in larger enterprises.  Other privileges were
informal in nature and perhaps a little dubious (e.g., many women workers tell of being allowed time
off to queue in shops).
In terms of occupations and industry branch, women and men were at least as segregated as in the
West.  Relatively few women held senior positions and this was for two reasons.  Firstly, women
undertook a very large share of domestic duties thus incurring a double burden and leaving them less
time to pursue a career than men.  Secondly, the revolution in gender relations in the West, which has
brought about a slow but fundamental shift in the household division of labour, did not happen in the
communist countries.
Historically, in many centrally planned economies, women’s labour market participation was high and
gender pay gaps low in comparison to many Western economies.  For example, in the former SovietWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Union (and in the centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe) female participation
rates were regularly over 85 percent, while in the West rates of this kind have only recently been
observed in some Scandinavian countries. Since 1989 participation has been falling for women in
many transitional economies (see UNICEF (1999)).  The scale of the collapse in participation in the
era of transition is very large.  For example, in Poland, a country roughly the size of one of the larger
European Union states, about one and a half million female jobs disappeared between 1989 and 1994.
The labour market remains the conduit through which reform policies impact on a country’s standard
of living (see Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar (1991)) and is the market through which many of the
rewards of transition are transmitted.  An interesting question is how the transitional process have
been affected the labour market prospects of women.  The welfare of both men and women crucially
depends on the rate at which the transitional economies recover and develop.  Labour market earnings
remain an important component of household income in all the transitional economies and provide a
direct link between household welfare and economic activity.
In the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the period 1989 to 1995,
Allison and Ringold (1996) identified older workers as more vulnerable to unemployment.  However,
they failed to uncover evidence of a gender dimension to unemployment but noted the decline in
female participation in all transitional economies (see also UNICEF (1999)).  For the same set of
countries covering approximately the same time period, Rutkowski (1996) highlighted the dramatic
fall in real wages experienced in all these economies, the increased incidence of low pay, and the
steady rise in wage inequality.
There is now a large empirical literature exploring labour market outcomes in the transitional
economies.  This includes a growing literature investigating the evolution of the wage position of
women in the transitional economies (see, e.g., Orasem and Vodopivec (1995) for Slovenia, Orasem
and Vodopivec (1999) for Estonia and Slovenia, Brainerd (1999), Glinskaya and Mroz (1996),
Newell and Reilly (1996) and Reilly (1999) for Russia, and Hunt (1998) using a sample of East
German workers).  The purpose of this paper is to add to this literature and examine the trends in the
gender pay gap for a selection of transitional economies with a view to assessing whether, in regard to
pay, women are gaining, losing or standing still since the collapse of communism.
The following section presents the methodology to be used, outlines some of its limitations, and
discusses the empirical results.  Section three is devoted to a quantile regression approach toWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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computing the ceteris paribus gender pay gap.  Section four examines the evolution of the gender pay
gap in two countries for which compatible data are available and section five offers some conclusions.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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2 The Gender Pay Gap
2.1 Basic Methodology
If we denote Wm and Wf as wages, a common measure used to summarise the female position in the
labour market is the ratio of average female pay to average male pay.  This is usually expressed as:
m
f
W
W      [1]
where the bars denote the average.
This gives the fraction of the average male pay earned by women and is the known as the gender pay
ratio.  Viewing the male wage as a ‘mark-up’ on the female wage is generally the dominant approach
adopted by economists   The use of natural logarithms allows us to compute an average mark-up (D)
as follows:
D  =  ) ln( ) ln( f m W W − [2]
The fundamental problem with either of the expressions [1] or [2] is that, although they may provide
an estimate of the gender pay gap, they provide no insight into that part of the gender pay gap, which
is attributable to differences in productivity characteristics between the two groups.
In order to inform on gender wage effects, it is useful to control for differences in productivity
variables that may exist between gender groups.  This requirement demands use of multivariate
statistical analysis that allows the researcher to control (or hold constant) other factors, whilst
exploring the effect of the characteristic of interest (i.e., gender) on the variable of interest (i.e., the
wage).  The other factors held constant are usually productivity characteristics and thus wage
differences mediated through the characteristic of interest are reflecting wage differences for broadly
comparable workers.  It has become conventional for economists to specify a relationship between the
natural logarithm of earnings and the set of characteristics.
If we define w as the natural logarithm of W and specify a wage equation as:William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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w = X′′′ ′β  + δ G + e [3]
where X is a vector of productivity characteristics (e.g., education and labour force experience), and
G is a qualitative variable for gender adopting a value of one if the worker is male and zero if female.
β   is a vector of coefficients representing the effect of the productivity variables on the natural
logarithmic wage (w) and e is a random error term.     The estimation procedure required to provide
estimates for the coefficients β  and δ  is usually Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).       
The equation described in [3] can be used to obtain an average estimate for the adjusted gender pay
gap.  If we denote the OLS estimates for β  and δ  as 
∧
β and 
∧
δ  respectively, we can re-write [3] as:
=
∧
w  X′′′ ′
∧
β  + 
∧
δ G
The adjusted gender pay gap could be written as:
D
A = [
∧
w X, G =1] - [
∧
w  X, G =0] = 
∧
δ  [4]
 Any difference between D  and  
∧
δ  (or D
A) is therefore attributable to the productivity characteristics
contained in the X vector.  The 
∧
δ  simply reflects a parallel shifting upwards of the regression line.  In
other words, the only part of the estimated relationship allowed to change through the inclusion of a
gender variable in this analysis is the estimated intercept term.  It may well be the case that the effects
of education, labour force experience and other characteristics on earnings differ across gender groups
and this pooled regression approach fails to capture this.
The constraint imposed by using a pooled relationship has prompted extensive use of separate
equations for men and women. In this approach, we estimate a male equation of the following form:
wm = Xm′′′ ′β m + em [5]William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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and a female equation of the following form:
wf = Xf′′′ ′β f  +  ef [6]
In this case the subscripts m and f denote male and female respectively.  It is assumed that the sample
of male data points are randomly chosen from the population of males and the sample of female data
points are randomly chosen from the population of females.
An important property of the OLS procedure is that the regression plane passes through the means of
the data.  We could re-write the above expressions as:
m w =  m β '
∧
m X [5′ ]
f w =  f β '
∧
f X [6′ ]
If we recall from above, we could re-write [2] as:
) ln( ) ln( f m W W − =  m w  -  f w
=  m β '
∧
m X -  f β '
∧
f X
After some manipulation, we can obtain:
= ] β   - β [ '      β ]' [ f m m
∧ ∧ ∧
+ − f f m X X X [7]
This allows the overall average differential in wages between the two gender groups to be
decomposed into a part attributable to differences in productivity characteristics (as evaluated at the
male returns) and a part attributable to differences in the estimated relationship between men and
women (i.e., the gender differences in returns).  These two components have been referred to as the
‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ components, with the ‘unexplained’ component also referred to as the
‘residual’ component (see Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973)).  It is the latter part of expression [7],William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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which provides the average estimate of the gender pay gap adjusted for productivity characteristics.
We could express the last part of expression [7] as:
∆ UF = 
∧
∆ β ' f X  [8]
where 
∧
∆ β=  f m β   - β
∧ ∧
This approach is commonly referred to as the ‘index number’ approach given its similarity to the
calculation of index numbers.  The use of an ‘index number’ approach is subject to the famous ‘index
number’ problem.  It is clear that expression [9] could be recomputed using the ‘basket’ of average
male characteristics.  Under such circumstances, we could re-express [9] as:
) ln( ) ln( f m W W − = ] β   - β [ '      β ]' [ f m f
∧ ∧ ∧
+ − m f m X X X
The last part of this expression could be expressed as:
∆ UM = 
∧
∆ β ' m X  [9]
and provides another estimate for the average adjusted gender pay gap based on average male
characteristics.  Given the ‘index number problem’, this may be different from expression [8].
Gender pay gap estimates based on 
∧
δ ,  ] β   - β [ ' f m
∧ ∧
f X and  ] β   - β [ ' f m
∧ ∧
m X  are computed using a selection of
data sets for transitional economies.  The standard error for 
∧
δ  is computed using the OLS formula
and expressions for the standard errors of the ‘index number’ quantities are computed in a
conventional manner.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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2.2 Some Methodological Issues
There are a number of potential problems that attach to use of this particular methodology in
identifying an accurate empirical measure of female wage disadvantage.  These include, inter alia, the
measurement of labour force experience (i.e., actual or potential), the legitimacy of including controls
that may reflect the outcome of discriminatory processes (e.g., occupations and industries), and the
problem of selection bias.
A key explanatory variable in the analysis of the gender pay gap is labour force experience.  Since
women generally bear the labour market costs of family formation, their level of labour force
experience is likely to be below that of men, and this ultimately impacts on the female wage.  The
most desirable measure to use in such circumstances is actual labour force experience.  Given data
constraints this is invariably unavailable and many of our data sets contain insufficient household
level information to impute labour force experience.  Potential labour force experience can be used
but it has been shown that its use assigns a greater portion of the actual wage difference to the
unexplained or ‘residual’ component.  For the purposes of our analysis we use age and its quadratic as
a proxy measure for labour force experience but acknowledge its limitations in this regard.
The methodology outlined relies on the specification of a well defined human capital model
augmented by factors designed to capture compensating differentials and monopoly rents associated
with an individual’s job or sector of attachment.
  The validity of the methodology is contingent on the
estimated equations providing adequate fits to the data and a stable set of parameter estimates that are
consistent with economic theory.  This should be borne in mind when interpreting the results obtained
using this methodology. It remains a matter of continuing debate as to what controls should (and
should not) be included in the specifications.  The general evidence is that the greater the number of
control variables, the greater the explained portion and the smaller the unexplained portion (i.e., the
average productivity adjusted pay gap).  If there is gender discrimination by occupation or by industry,
then such controls may reflect the outcome of a discriminatory process and could not qualify as
legitimate exogenous variables in the wage equation.  We acknowledge again this potential problem
and in order to provide some insight into the effects on the gender pay gap of adding controls, we
provide estimates for both an austere specification with only human capital controls and anWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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augmented specification which allows for an array of additional controls including, in most cases
industry, occupation and regional controls.
In the context of the potential problems associated with sample selection bias, standard correction
procedures can be adopted (see Heckman (1979)).  However, they have been subject to much
criticism given their sensitivity to identifying restrictions and their general lack of robustness (see
Manski, 1989).  The absence of adequate identifying restrictions in most of our data sets restricts our
ability to address this issue in a satisfactory manner.  Thus, the econometric analysis reported in this
paper does not deal with the issue of participation selectivity bias.
There are some important methodological issues relating to the measurement of women’s wages in
the context of transitional economies.  The pay measure used in our comparisons relates to earnings
received in the main job by employees.  The emphasis on main job earnings excludes from the
analysis the treatment of secondary earnings.  The incidence of secondary job holding has increased in
many transitional economies but, to our knowledge, its gender dimension has not been the subject of
investigation.  Our focus on employees in their main job eliminates measurement errors that would
certainly attach to the reporting of earnings on jobs in the secondary or informal sector.
The incidence of payment arrears in a number of the transitional economies (most notably Russia,
Ukraine, the Central Asian republics and FR Yugoslavia) may have important gender implications.
The dislocations created by the transitional process in both the Russian Federation and the Ukraine
triggered inter-enterprise payment arrears as enterprises were faced with hardened budget constraints
that ultimately lead to the emergence of employee wage arrears.  Enterprise managers could have used
wage arrears as a discriminatory tool favouring male workers.  The focus on wages paid may be
misleading but data limitations confine the analysis to wages paid rather than wages due.  As noted by
Glinskaya and Mroz (1996), the effect of payment arrears on the gender pay gap is ambiguous but the
inclusion of occupational controls may serve to mitigate such effects.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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2.3  Empirical Estimates of the Gender Pay Gap
Table 1 contains gender pay ratios based on expression [1] for seventeen countries undergoing
transitional change. The data are based on monthly earnings and are obtained from a variety of
international and national sources.  For some of these countries we also report ratios from the period
of central planning using gender pay ratio estimates from Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), who
used data from the late 1980s.  It should be noted that monthly ratios tend to be lower than ratios
based on an hourly measure as men, on average, work longer hours than women.  Despite this
consideration, most of the reported ratios are relatively high compared to Western countries.  They
also suggest a mild contraction in the unadjusted gender pay gap since the introduction of reforms in
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  The ratios for Russia, Romania, Slovenia, the
FR Yugoslavia and Kyrgystan are characterised by relative stability over the transitional period whilst
the Bulgarian ratio registers a fall of five percentage points.  The average monthly female earnings for
the most recent years for Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Ukraine and Uzbekistan range from two-
thirds to just over three quarters of male earnings and suggest little movement in this gap since the
period of central planning.
The table provides contrasting country experiences in terms of the size and evolution of the gender
pay gap.  This type of summary analysis of the gender pay ratio, however, may provide a misleading
picture of the female labour market position.  Evidence of a stable or contracting gap may be due to
the influence exerted by measured and/or unmeasured selection effects.  For instance, a contraction in
the gender pay gap may be partly attributable to the withdrawal from the transitional labour markets
of poorly qualified women (see Hunt (1998)).
Eleven transitional countries provide the basis for our individual-level analysis and these are Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Latvia, Russia, the
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.  In the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and
Uzbekistan the surveys only reported monthly earnings without information on monthly hours
worked.  All other survey data allowed us to compute our preferred hourly wage gap measure.
Table 2 reports a selection of gender pay gaps for these countries over a number of years.  The first
column of estimates reports the gender pay gap (rather than ratios) unadjusted for controls of any kindWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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(i.e.,  D in expression 2).  If we look at the estimates for the 1990s, the unadjusted hourly pay gaps
range from just over 10% for Yugoslav employees to about 35% for Bulgarian employees.
The second column of this table reports the gender pay gaps based on the estimate from a pooled
equation that includes only human capital controls (i.e., education and the proxies for labour force
experience).  The fits of the estimated pooled hourly equations, as measured by the adjusted-R
2, vary
from 0.04 for Russia to 0.19 for FR Yugoslavia – both for 1996.  The fits for the pooled monthly
equations vary from 0.15 in Uzbekistan to 0.42 for the Czech Republic.  All the estimated gender
effects are statistically significant at a conventional level.  For most countries there is little movement
in the gender pay gap once allowance is made for the set of human capital controls.  However, in the
cases of Latvia, Poland, Russia and the Ukraine, a steep rise in the adjusted gender pay gap is
observed relative to the unadjusted measure.  This suggests, particularly for these countries, that
women’s education levels are probably slightly higher than men’s, so controlling for this reveals a
larger gender pay gap.
The third and fourth columns of table 2 provide estimates for the gender pay gap based on expressions
[8] and [9] respectively with standard errors reported in parentheses.  Z and 
∧
α  denote the vectors of
human capital characteristics and estimated coefficients respectively.  The separate estimation of
wage equations offers no new insights with the estimates for [8] and [9] dimensionally comparable to
the pooled estimate in almost all cases.  All the estimated effects are again significant and the
estimates do not appear all that sensitive to the vector of characteristics used.
The fifth column of table 2 reports the estimated gender effect for specifications augmented to include
additional controls.  One has to be cautious in interpreting the estimates in this column, however,
since the augmented controls are not identical across all countries.  In most cases they do include
controls for occupations, industry, and region.  The inclusion of additional wage determining
variables enhances the fits in most cases.  The magnitude of the gender effect declines in most
countries once these controls are entered but actually increases in the case of Uzbekistan.  In all cases,
however, the estimated gender effects remain statistically significant.
  The sixth and seventh columns of table 2 provide estimates for the gender pay gap based on
expressions [8] and [9] respectively with standard errors reported in parentheses.  X and 
∧
β denote the
vectors of characteristics and estimated coefficients respectively in this case.  The picture remainsWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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broadly the same as column five although there is now some evidence of sensitivity in the estimates
depending on which vector of characteristics is used.  Nevertheless, one generalization offered by the
table is that for all transitional countries, most of the average gender pay gap is attributed to treatment
effects rather than differences in endowments.  One can only speculate as to how much of the
differential assigned to the treatment component is due to our inappropriate measurement of female
labour force experience.  It is evident that there would be significant differences in the endowment of
this particular variable by gender, so it is worth bearing this in mind in interpreting this set of results.
3.          Quantile Regression Results
The methodologies outlined up to now rely entirely on the decomposition of a mean regression.  An
exclusive focus on the average may provide misleading insights into the gender pay gap.   The
quantile regression approach (see, Chamberlain (1994)) provides a framework within which the
ceteris paribus gender pay gap can be estimated at a particular quantile of the distribution as opposed
to simply the mean.  The applicability of quantile regression techniques has been limited by
computational constraints.  This is no longer the case and median regression can be defined by
minimizing the absolute sums of the errors rather, as in least squares, minimizing the sum of squares.
The estimator is known as the Least Absolute Deviations or LAD estimator.  If we return to our
pooled specification and introduce the i subscripts for i= 1,…,n, we could re-write [3] as:
wi = Xi′β  + δ Gi + ei [10]
The median regression coefficients can be obtained by choosing the values that minimize L
L = ∑
=
− −
n
1 i
i i i δG β ' X w = () () i i i i i i
n
1 i
δG β ' X w sgn δG β ' X w − − − − ∑
=
[11]
Where sgn(a) is the sign of a, 1 if a is positive, and –1 if  a is negative or zero.
The computation of the estimates is a linear programming problem.  In contrast to the OLS approach,
the quantile regression procedure is less sensitive to outliers and provides a more robust estimator in
the face of departures from normality (see Koenker and Bassett (1978)).  Quantile regression models
may also have better properties than OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity.  It is desirable toWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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explore quantile regressions other than the median.  Using this methodology, the log wage equation is
estimated conditional on a given specification and then calculated at various percentiles of the
residuals (e.g., the 10
th, the 25
th, the 75
th or the 90
th) by minimizing the sum of absolute deviations of
the residuals from the conditional specification.  In the context of the regression model specified,
quantile regression estimation would allow the estimation of the δ  parameter at the 10
th, 25
th, 50
th,
75
th and 90
th percentile.  Estimates for δ  obtained in this manner would allow the investigator to
establish the magnitude of the ceteris paribus gender pay gap at different points of the wage
distribution.  This could be important if it was felt that the average provided a misleading picture.
Given our findings in the last section, there appears little loss in modelling earnings for our set of
transitional countries using the type of pooled specification described in [10].  Table 3 provides
estimates for a set of quantile regressions at the median, the 10
th, 25
th, 75
th and the 90
th percentiles.
The log wage quantile regression at, for instance, the 10
th percentile predicts the value of the log wage
at the 10th percentile rather than at the mean and the interpretation of the gender dummy is the
percent (or log point) difference, ceteris paribus, between the male and female 10th percentile wage.
For completeness, the table also reports the estimated gender effect at the mean, which was reported
earlier in table 2.  Estimates are again reported for two specifications: the basic human capital model
and the specification augmented by the inclusion of additional wage determining controls.
For most countries, there is little material difference between the mean and median regression
estimates.  One exception is Russia for 1996 where a 0.068 log point difference in the gender effect is
reported but in comparison to the estimated standard errors for these estimates this difference is not
viewed as sizeable.  An examination of the estimated gender effect over the different percentiles
provides some insight into the ceteris paribus gender pay gap in low paid jobs (10
th percentile) and in
high paid jobs (90
th percentile).  For convenience, we only focus on the estimates from the augmented
specifications.  In most countries there is a steady rise in the estimated gender pay gap as we move
from low-paid to high-paid jobs.  The most dramatic increase in the gap between the 90
th and 10
th
percentiles is reported for Kazakstan where the difference is of the order of 0.33 log points.  Other
sizeable differences are reported for Uzbekistan (0.186 log points) and for Russia in 1996 (0.142 log
points).  In marked contrast to all other countries reported, the estimates for the Ukraine suggest a
steady decline as we move across the distribution with the ceteris paribus gender pay gap declining
by about 0.168 log points between the 10
th and the 90
th percentile.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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4. The Evolution of the Gender Pay Gap
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) provide an additional dimension to decomposing the gender pay gap,
which introduces a temporal dimension to the analysis.  The ‘unexplained’ or ‘residual’ differential
can be decomposed further into a part attributable to differences in percentile rankings within the
residual wage distribution and to a part due to wage dispersion.   The advantage of adopting the
extended decomposition suggested by Juhn et al. is that it facilitates an examination of the factors that
influence the gender pay gap over time.
Assume the following male wage equation for worker i in year t:
wit = Xit′β t + uit [12]
or
wit = Xit′β t + σ tθ it [12*]
where:
wit  =  natural logarithm of wages for individual i at time t;
Xit  =  vector of explanatory variables for individual i at time t;
β t   =  vector of male coefficients at time t;
σ t = the residual standard deviation of male wages;
θ it = standardized residual with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 (i.e. uit ÷σ t  given
the average residual is zero) 
In average terms, and with m and f denoting male and female respectively, the gender wage gap for
year t (denoted by Dt) is given by:
t t t ft mt t     X     =      w -    w     =      D θ ∆ σ + β ∆
∧
[13]
where:
ft mt t X - X X = ∆William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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and:
t
ft ft
t
mt mt
t ' X w ' X w
σ
β − −
σ
β − = θ ∆
∧ ∧
with bars denoting mean values and hats the OLS estimates.
The first component of the final part of expression [13] provides an estimate of the portion of the
average gender wage gap attributable to differences in observable characteristics; the final component
is usually interpreted as the discrimination effect.  This is a simple re-expression of the ‘index
number’ decomposition encountered in expression [7].  The difference in this gap between two years
(for example, 1996 and 1992) can be decomposed using [13] as:
) - (
) ]( X [ ] X X [   D   -   D
92     96 92 92   96 9
92 96 92       96 92   96    92 96
    +      }   -   {
   +   -    =
∧
6
∧
  −
∧ ∧
β β θ ∆ θ ∆ θ ∆ σ
β β ∆ β ∆ ∆
∧
     +     
[14]
The first term captures the effect of changes in observable characteristics over time on the gender
wage gap (e.g., changes in skill quantities like education and labour force experience); the second
term captures the effect of changes in observable prices over time on the gender wage gap (e.g.,
changes in skill prices like the returns to education and experience); the third term captures what is
called the ‘gap effect’ which measures the impact of changes in the relative position of men and
women in the residual wage distribution on the gender wage gap; the fourth term reflects the role of
changes in residual wage inequality on the gender wage gap.  The first and third terms measure gender
specific factors, the second and fourth terms measure ‘wage structure’ effects.  In a traditional wage
decomposition framework, the third and fourth terms are commonly interpreted as providing
estimates of discrimination.  The procedure requires the estimation of male wage equations for each
year of interest.  The decomposition, as expressed in [14], relies on the properties of the Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimator.  In addition, only male coefficients are used in this analysis since they
could be viewed as providing ‘cleaner’ estimates of the prices for the quantities used in our analysis
given they are less likely to be influenced by discriminatory processes that may be at work.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Juhn et al. (1991, 1993) and Blau and Khan (1992, 1994 and 1996) interpret the last two terms of
expression [17] as reflecting the effects of unmeasured skills and prices respectively.  Suen (1997)
argues that such an interpretation is only valid if the percentile rankings are independent of the
standard deviation of the wage residuals.  However, this cannot be the case since the change in the
‘gap effect’ could not have occurred in the absence of a change in wage dispersion.  This does not
vitiate applying the decomposition but highlights a requirement for caution in the economic
interpretation attached to these terms.  In particular, the use of these terms to provide inferences on
changes in unobservable prices and quantities is prone to error and the tendency of some authors to
interpret the ‘gap effect’ independently of the dispersion effect as indicative of progress on the part of
women is demonstrably unjustified.
The movement of the gender pay gap in the economies undergoing transitional change has recently
been the subject of empirical investigation.  Orasem and Vodopivec (1995, 1999), Reilly (1999) and
Hunt (1998) have provided insights into its evolution for Slovenia, Sovenia and Estonia, Russia and
East Germany respectively.  In this paper, we look at just two countries: Russia and FR Yugoslavia.
The decompositions reported in table 4 are based on hourly wages and the mean regression for the
augmented specification using the sample of male workers only.  The years of comparison are 1992
and 1996 for Russia, and 1995 and 1996 for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  A negative entry
indicates an effect that reduces the gender pay gap.
In both cases the changes in the gender pay gap have been negligible.  The contribution of changes in
observed characteristics is small suggesting little evidence of a selection effect in observable
variables.  The effect of wage dispersion on the gender pay gap is most pronounced in Russia but is
offset by movements in returns to human capital that appear favourable to women.  On the basis of
these two transitional economies, and over the time period examined, there is little evidence of
anything more than minor movements in the observed gender pay gap.  These results are broadly in
line with the findings of Orasem and Vodopivec (1995, 1999) for Slovenia and Estonia and Reilly
(1999) for Russia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
17
5 Conclusions
The review of the evidence and the analysis undertaken suggests that, in general, the gap in pay
between men and women in the transitional countries is low by international standards.  Our use of
age as a proxy for labour force experience is accepted as questionable and may assign more to the
gender effect than is actually justified.  This could be taken to suggest that the actual adjusted gender
pay gap estimates are, if anything, lower than those reported in this paper.
On the basis of the evidence, it could be argued that, although there are marked contrasts in the
relative wage position of the average woman across the transitional economies, the adjustment
process itself appears, heretofore, to have been approximately neutral to female pay position relative
to the average male.  This is perhaps most surprising for Russia and other CIS countries where there
have been large increases in wage inequality.  It seems that in these countries, contrary to expectation,
the relative pay position of women has not worsened on average.
Hunt (1998), looking at data from former East Germany, highlights the importance of selection effects
when interpreting movements in the gender pay gap.  In the four years subsequent to unification, the
wages of East German women rose by ten percentage points relative to men.  Hunt estimates that
four-fifths of this rise was attributable to a selection effect caused by the withdrawal from
employment of poorly qualified women.  This raises the question whether the apparent stability of the
average gender pay gap observed for other transitional economies conceals more important underlying
movements in the labour market status of women.  Although the data available is limited and prevents
a deeper analysis of this issue, the message from other countries is the East German experience is
atypical.  The departure from the German labour market of poorly qualified women is facilitated by
the existence of a much more generous social safety net in Germany than currently in existence in the
other transitional countries.  Although selection effects may be present in our data, current labour
market conditions and the necessity for households to have dual income earners have prevented a
widespread departure from work of poorly qualified women.  This is confirmed by the fact, as
highlighted in an earlier section, that the female share of employment has remained relatively constant
in most economies over the transitional period.
The quantile regression analysis undertaken provided an insight into the ceteris paribus gender pay
gap as we move across the wage distribution.  In all but one country, there was evidence of largerWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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gaps in the higher paid jobs relative to the lower paid jobs.  This general result flags an important and
clearly justifies further research.
In framing the analysis purely in terms of gender pay differentials, it is important to note that pay gaps
within gender groups are also important.  Waldfogel (1998a) identifies a widening family wage gap
for young cohorts of women where young women with children in the United States have higher
gender pay gaps than women without children.  Waldfogel (1998b) also found that job-protected
maternity leave offsets the negative wage effects of having children in both the United States and
Great Britain.  This is clearly an issue worthy of investigation for the transitional economies where
the provision of job-protected maternity leave is unlikely to represent a key priority to employers as
private sector employment grows.
Finally, it is salutary to note that the gender pay gap appears to have exhibited a degree of stability
over a very volatile period in the post-centralization era in most transitional economies.  Nevertheless,
the gender dimension of employment and unemployment has not been explored in this paper nor have
the effects of enterprise re-structuring, the re-shaping of the social safety net, and the reform of family
benefits.  Together these have clear implications for the welfare of women.  It may be the case that
time will show that these factors exert more important influences on the welfare of women in
transitional economies than the evolution of the gender pay gap.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Table 1: Monthly Gender Pay Ratios in Transitional Economies for Selected Years
Country Year Ratio
Czech Republic 
a) 1987
1992
1996
0.661
0.730
0.813
Hungary 
b) 1986
1992
1996
0.743
0.808
0.789
Poland 
c) 1985
1992
1996
0.737
0.790
0.790
Slovakia 
d) 1987
1992
1996
0.661
0.733
0.782
Bulgaria 
e) 1990
1995
1997
0.740
0.700
0.691
Romania 
f) 1994
1996
0.786
0.760
Slovenia 
g) 1987
1991
1996
0.870
0.905
0.869
FR Yugoslavia 
h) 1995
1996
1997
0.899
0.888
0.884
Estonia 
i) 1997 0.750
Latvia 
j) 1997 0.799
Lithuania 
k) 1997 0.650 (m)
0.710 (n)
Russia 
l) 1989
1992
1996
0.709
0.685
0.695
Ukraine 
m) 1996 0.777
Kazakhstan 
n) 1996 0.723
Kyrkgystan 
o) 1995
1996
1997
0.733
0.730
0.720
Uzbekistan 
p) 1995 0.805
Sources:
a) Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and Social Stratification Surveys.  b)   MONEE Database Project.
c) Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and Polish Labour Force Surveys. d) Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and Social
Stratification Surveys.   e) MONEE Database Project.  f)  MONEE Database Project.   g) Orasem and Vodopivec (1995)
and MONEE Database Project.  h)  FRY Labour Force Surveys.   i) MONEE Database Project.  j) MONEE Database
Project.   k)  MONEE Database Project; n and m denotes manual and non-manual workers respectively.  l) Atkinson and
Micklewright (1992) and Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Surveys.  m) Ukraine Living Standards Measurement Survey.
n) Kazakhstan Livings Standard Measurement Survey.  o) MONEE Database Project.  p) The European University
Institute and Essex University Survey in Uzbekistan.
Notes. The MONEE Database Project is maintained at UNICEF’s International Child Development Centre.  See UNICEF
(1999) for a reference.  All the other data sources are either available from the World Bank’s LSMS web site or were
communicated to the authors, mostly from national statistical offices.  The authors will respond to all reasonable data
enquiries.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Table 2: Gender Pay Gaps for Selected Transitional Economies
Country Year Pay
Measure
D
B
∧
δ
∧
α ∆ ' Zf
∧
α ∆ ' Zm A
∧
δ
∧
β ∆ ' Xf
∧
β ∆ ' Xm Nf Nm
Bulgaria 1995 Hourly 0.301  0.318
(0.031)
  0.316
(0.030)
 0.313
(0.032)
 0.248
(0.034)
 0.216
(0.035)
 0.293
(0.035)
834 944
Adjusted-R
2 0.099 0.086 0.036 0.138 0.107 0.106
Czech
Republic
1984 Monthly 0.377  0.371
(0.012)
 0.374
(0.012)
 0.361
(0.012)
 0.327
(0.013)
  0.327
(0.014)
0.326
(0.014)
956 1155
Adjusted-R
2 0.419 0.257 0.141 0.467 0.312 0.233
Czech
Republic
1992 Monthly 0.316  0.312
(0.014)
 0.308
(0.014)
 0.316
(0.014)
 0.282
(0.015)
 0.254
(0.021)
 0.311
(0.017)
1406 1610
Adjusted-R
2 0.263 0.182 0.135 0.339 0.278 0.222
Hungary 1992 Monthly 0.226  0.246
(0.018)
 0.248
(0.020)
 0.249
(0.019)
 0.210
(0.020)
 0.186
(0.026)
 0.251
(0.023)
833 903
Adjusted-R
2 0.313 0.290 0.248 0.378 0.366 0.316
Kazakhstan 1996 Hourly 0.197  0.246
(0.057)
 0.263
(0.060)
 0.245
(0.057)
 0.270
(0.052)
 0.303
(0.055)
 0.247
(0.056)
572 624
Adjusted-R
2 0.052 0.054 0.033 0.180 0.133 0.205
Latvia 1996 Hourly 0.190  0.238
(0.027)
 0.244
(0.027)
 0.222
(0.027)
 0.234
(0.028)
 0.249
(0.029)
 0.212
(0.036)
853 863
Adjusted-R
2  0.144  0.129  0.125 0.265 0.272 0.233
Poland 1992 Hourly 0.095  0.190
(0.007)
 0.172
(0.009)
 0.205
(0.007)
 0.182
(0.007)
 0.164
(0.009)
 0.196
(0.007)
7003 8364
Adjusted-R
2 0.266  0.343 0.196 0.274 0.205 0.351
Poland 1996 Hourly 0.131  0.215
(0.006)
 0.202
(0.007)
 0.228
(0.006)
 0.174
(0.006)
 0.162
(0.007)
 0.209
(0.009)
7202 8611
Adjusted-R
2 0.314 0.377 0.445 0.399 0.244 0.355William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Table 2 (cont’d)
Russia 1992 Hourly 0.251  0.302
(0.021)
 0.315
(0.021)
 0.305
(0.021)
 0.200
(0.024)
 0.226
(0.030)
 0.185
(0.027)
2800 2863
Adjusted-R
2  0.071 0.044 0.052 0.163 0.125 0.165
Russia 1996 Hourly 0.244  0.299
(0.046)
 0.297
(0.049)
 0.299
(0.048)
 0.230
(0.052)
 0.289
(0.060)
 0.191
(0.059)
1013  908
Adjusted-R
2  0.041 0.022 0.031 0.127 0.118 0.123
Slovakia 1984 Monthly 0.332  0.333
(0.016)
 0.335
(0.017)
 0.329
(0.017)
 0.309
(0.018)
 0.321
(0.022)
 0.294
(0.024)
466 557
Adjusted-R
2 0.400 0.207 0.189 0.427 0.273 0.213
Slovakia 1992 Monthly 0.310  0.322
(0.017)
 0.321
(0.017)
 0.325
(0.018)
 0.310
(0.020)
 0.290
(0.026)
 0.363
(0.022)
653 1204
Adjusted-R
2 0.245 0.174 0.105 0.304 0.263 0.178
Ukraine 1996 Hourly 0.186  0.244
(0.052)
 0.236
(0.053)
 0.246
(0.053)
 0.202
(0.056)
 0.180
(0.063)
 0.160
(0.069)
496 500
Adjusted-R
2 0.083 0.085 0.069 0.137 0.122 0.148
Uzbekistan 1995 Monthly 0.216  0.216
(0.032)
 0.213
(0.032)
 0.218
(0.032)
 0.261
(0.030)
 0.261
(0.030)
 0.260
(0.031)
 696 886
Adjusted-R
2 0.155 0.175 0.123 0.297 0.305 0.269
Yugoslavia 1995 Hourly 0.102  0.120
(0.018)
 0.119
(0.018)
 0.112
(0.018)
 0.113
(0.019)
 0.107
(0.021)
 0.128
(0.022)
1299 1950
Adjusted-R
2 0.177 0.200 0.152 0.264 0.299 0.231
Yugoslavia 1996 Hourly 0.116  0.139
(0.020)
 0.143
(0.020)
 0.132
(0.021)
 0.140
(0.021)
 0.132
(0.024)
 0.150
(0.026)
1266 1930
Adjusted-R
2 0.194 0.197 0.182 0.267 0.293 0.242William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Notes to table 2:
1) Data Sources:
a)  Bulgarian Household Budget Survey
b)    Social Stratification Surveys
c)    Social Stratification Surveys
d)    Polish Labour Force Surveys
e)    Social stratification Surveys
f)    FRY Labour Force Surveys
g)    Latvian Household Budget Survey
h)   Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Surveys
i)   Ukraine Living Standards Measurement Survey
j)   Kazakhstan Labour Force Survey
k)           The European University Institute and Essex University Survey in Uzbekistan
2) B
∧
δ is the estimated OLS coefficient from the pooled equation that includes only human capital controls.
3) A
∧
δ is the estimated OLS coefficient from the pooled equation that includes human capital and other controls.
4) The Z vector includes only human capital controls; the X vector includes human capital and other controls.
5) The Adjusted-R
2s reported in columns two to seven refer to the basic pooled equation, the basic female equation, the basic male equation, the augmented pool
equation, the augmented female equation, and the augmented male equation respectively.
6) Nf and Nm refer to the female and male sample sizes respectively.      
7) White (1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses.
8) The variance for the decompositions are computed as  Z V ' Z j j
∧
 where j=m or f, and 
∧
Vis the sum of the male and female variance-covariance matrices
corrected for heteroscedasticity. William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Table 3: Quantile Regression Estimates of the Gender Pay Gaps for Selected
Transitional Economies
Country Year Pay
Measure
Controls Mean 10
th 25
th 50
th 75
th 90
th N
Bulgaria 1995 Hourly Basic
All
 0.318
(0.031)
 0.248
(0.034)
 0.158
(0.031)
 0.144
(0.032)
 0.232
(0.023)
 0.205
(0.024)
 0.294
(0.019)
 0.235
(0.020)
 0.336
(0.023)
 0.250
(0.024)
 0.425
(0.032)
 0.273
(0.038)
1778
Czech
Republic
1984 Monthly Basic
All
 0.371
(0.012)
 0.327
(0.013)
 0.366
(0.153)
 0.322
(0.018)
 0.369
(0.011)
 0.325
(0.012)
 0.351
(0.009)
 0.321
(0.010)
 0.365
(0.011)
 0.341
(0.012)
 0.402
(0.015)
 0.331
(0.017)
2111
Czech
Republic
1992 Monthly Basic
All
 0.312
(0.014)
 0.282
(0.015)
 0.244
(0.016)
 0.236
(0.018)
 0.292
(0.012)
 0.269
(0.013)
 0.330
(0.010)
 0.299
(0.011)
 0.352
(0.012)
 0.301
(0.013)
 0.348
(0.018)
 0.320
(0.019)
3016
Hungary 1992 Monthly Basic
All
 0.246
(0.018)
 0.210
(0.020)
 0.173
(0.022)
 0.181
(0.024)
 0.239
(0.016)
 0.211
(0.018)
 0.279
(0.014)
 0.212
(0.015)
 0.271
(0.017)
 0.226
(0.018)
 0.345
(0.025)
 0.253
(0.027)
1736
Khazakstan 1996 Hourly Basic
All
 0.246
(0.057)
 0.270
(0.052)
 0.059
(0.072)
 0.178
(0.063)
 0.164
(0.049)
 0.175
(0.046)
 0.276
(0.042)
 0.272
(0.039)
 0.517
(0.051)
 0.477
(0.046)
 0.486
(0.069)
 0.508
(0.065)
1196
Latvia 1996 Hourly Basic
All
 0.238
(0.027)
 0.234
(0.028)
 0.160
(0.035)
 0.195
(0.037)
 0.226
(0.026)
 0.239
(0.026)
 0.242
(0.021)
 0.250
(0.022)
 0.279
(0.026)
 0.254
(0.026)
 0.211
(0.037)
 0.224
(0.037)
1716
Poland 1992 Hourly Basic
All
 0.190
(0.007)
 0.182
(0.007)
 0.141
(0.008)
 0.133
(0.009)
 0.173
(0.006)
 0.170
(0.006)
 0.215
(0.005)
 0.203
(0.005)
 0.235
(0.006)
 0.227
(0.006)
 0.244
(0.008)
 0.235
(0.009)
15367
Poland 1996 Hourly Basic
All
 0.215
(0.006)
 0.174
(0.006)
 0.137
(0.008)
 0.116
(0.008)
 0.184
(0.006)
 0.152
(0.006)
 0.231
(0.005)
 0.180
(0.005)
 0.273
(0.006)
 0.216
(0.006)
 0.296
(0.008)
 0.231
(0.009)
15813
Russia 1992 Hourly Basic
All
 0.302
(0.021)
 0.200
(0.024)
 0.179
(0.027)
 0.099
(0.030)
 0.282
(0.019)
 0.175
(0.021)
 0.355
(0.016)
 0.194
(0.018)
 0.377
(0.028)
 0.224
(0.021)
 0.327
(0.028)
 0.225
(0.031)
5663
Russia 1996 Hourly Basic
All
 0.294
(0.046)
 0.218
(0.052)
 0.225
(0.062)
 0.117
(0.069)
 0.274
(0.041)
 0.196
(0.047)
 0.364
(0.034)
 0.286
(0.038)
 0.299
(0.041)
 0.293
(0.045)
 0.265
(0.059)
 0.259
(0.061)
1921
Slovakia 1992 Monthly Basic
All
 0.333
(0.016)
 0.309
(0.018)
 0.331
(0.021)
 0.299
(0.025)
 0.335
(0.015)
 0.333
(0.017)
 0.336
(0.012)
 0.333
(0.014)
 0.330
(0.015)
 0.315
(0.016)
 0.345
(0.021)
 0.254
(0.023)
1023
Slovakia 1992 Monthly Basic
All
 0.322
(0.017)
 0.310
(0.020)
 0.317
(0.020)
 0.272
(0.023)
 0.281
(0.015)
 0.289
(0.016)
 0.317
(0.012)
 0.307
(0.013)
 0.343
(0.015)
 0.330
(0.016)
 0.395
(0.021)
 0.363
(0.024)
1857William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
24
Table 3 (Cont’d)
Country Year Pay
Measure
Controls Mean 10
th 25
th 50
th 75
th 90
th N
Ukraine 1996 Hourly Basic
All
 0.244
(0.052)
 0.210
(0.020)
 0.253
(0.070)
 0.286
(0.074)
 0.218
(0.046)
 0.228
(0.050)
 0.241
(0.046)
 0.255
(0.042)
 0.240
(0.046)
 0.153
(0.051)
 0.291
(0.062)
 0.118
(0.071)
996
Uzbekistan 1995 Monthly Basic
All
 0.216
(0.032)
 0.261
(0.030)
 0.073
(0.050)
 0.175
(0.041)
 0.141
(0.029)
 0.255
(0.028)
 0.151
(0.024)
 0.227
(0.022)
 0.271
(0.028)
 0.295
(0.026)
 0.420
(0.040)
 0.361
(0.036)
1582
Yugoslavia 1995 Hourly Basic
All
 0.120
(0.018)
 0.113
(0.019)
 0.097
(0.024)
 0.106
(0.025)
 0.113
(0.016)
 0.109
(0.016)
 0.101
(0.013)
 0.131
(0.013)
 0.143
(0.016)
 0.115
(0.016)
 0.139
(0.022)
 0.089
(0.022)
3249
Yugoslavia 1996 Hourly Basic
All
 0.139
(0.020)
 0.140
(0.021)
 0.159
(0.028)
 0.169
(0.029)
 0.095
(0.018)
 0.097
(0.019)
 0.122
(0.015)
 0.100
(0.015)
 0.155
(0.017)
 0.126
(0.018)
 0.197
(0.023)
 0.112
(0.025)
3196
Notes to table 3:
a) See notes to table 2.
b) The Basic specification contains only human controls.
c) The All specification includes additional controls including region, occupations and industry.
d) Mean denotes the mean regression, 10
th, 25
th, 50
th, 75
th, 90
th denote the relevant percentile.
e) N is the sample size.
f) Quantile regression analysis undertaken using TSP (version 4.3) (See Hall (1996)).William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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Table 4: The Gender Pay Gap over Time in Russia and Yugoslavia
_______________________________________________________________
Russia  FR Yugoslavia
_______________________________________________________________
Observed Change -0.007  0.014
of which:
Observed Characteristics -0.007            -0.007
Observed Prices -0.043            -0.004
‘Gap Effect’ -0.011  0.018
Wage Dispersion                      0.054  0.006
of which:
Gender Specific            -0.018              0.012
Wage Structure  0.011  0.002
_______________________________________________________________
Notes to table 4:
a) See notes to Table 2.
b) The wage measure is the hourly wage and the specification is the augmented one.
c)  The comparison is between 1996 and 1992 for Russia, and between 1996 and 1995 for Yugoslavia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 305
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